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NATHAN L. BROOKS was a substantial planter in Lowndes County, in Al-
abama’s Black Belt; in 1860, he had owned fifty-four slaves. In 1859 he had
been elected as one of Lowndes’s members of the state house of representa-
tives, and he had been re-elected in 1861. In 1865 he was chosen for a third
term. In the Presidential Reconstruction legislature, Representative Brooks
became the principal proponent of the enfranchisement of the freedmen, of-
fering first an amendment to the state constitution to grant the vote to literate
black males, and when that failed, pressing a resolution to call a referendum
on holding a new state constitutional convention. The enfranchising amend-
ment had drawn the support of only twelve representatives—six former large
slaveholders from the Black Belt and six former small or non-slaveholders.
The resolution for a new constitutional convention had done considerably
better, getting the support of thirty representatives on Brooks’s first effort
and thirty-four on his second one. Again, the coalition of supporters ap-
pears anomalous. On the first roll call, for instance, twelve of the thirty
supporters came from plantation counties and eighteen from small-farming
counties; eleven had been large slaveholders, five middling slaveholders, ten
small slaveholders, and four non-slaveholders.
The voting on Brooks’s various proposals indicates the complexity of
the issue. Alabama’s antebellum Constitution of 1819 had provided for
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the apportionment of seats in both houses of the state legislature on the
basis only of the counties’ white population. As a result of the use of this
“white basis,” the small-farming counties of the state’s hill country and of
the wiregrass region in its southeast dominated the legislature throughout
the antebellum era—to the great aggravation of the plantation counties,
who persistently saw their whiggish economic and social reform proposals
voted down by Jacksonian small-farmer members. In 1842 the Jacksonians
had extended the white basis to congressional districting as well, over fierce
Whig and Black Belt resistance.
The emancipation of the slaves, however, allowed Black Belters to re-
open this question. When the new constitutional convention mandated by
Presidential Reconstruction met in September 1865, the Black Belt delegates
maintained that, now that the slaves were free men, the legislature should
be apportioned on the basis of the total population. Delegates from the
small-farming counties succeeded in defeating this claim, though, by noting
that, since the constitution they were drafting barred the freedmen from
voting, the white basis actually correctly reflected the geographical distribu-
tion of the electorate. And so the Constitution of 1865 retained the white
basis provisions of the Constitution of 1819. It was in this context that
Representative Brooks and a group of his Black Belt colleagues set out to
alter the new constitution’s suffrage and apportionment provisions once the
legislature convened.
As the legislators considered Brooks’s proposals, the overruling question
for all of them was how enfranchised blacks would behave. The difficulty
that Representative Brooks faced in building a legislative majority was that
members of all backgrounds were deeply divided on this mystery. Brooks
and the five to ten other former planters who supported his efforts were
convinced that they could control the blacks, either through the economic
dependency of the freedmen or, if necessary, through coercion. If so, black
enfranchisement and apportionment on the basis of total population would
produce both Black Belt control of the legislature and strengthened statewide
electoral support for their whiggish perspectives. But the former planters in
the House were by no means united in their conviction that the blacks were
controllable. Whereas eleven former large slaveholders voted with Brooks
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for a new constitutional convention on the initial roll call, eight voted to
table the resolution.
At the same time, the representatives of the white small farmers would
not support black enfranchisement unless they could be convinced that the
black voters would have the capacity to resist planter intimidation or blan-
dishments. If so, it seemed possible that black voters would join poorer
whites in voting against planter hegemony and in defense of democratic and
egalitarian convictions. But the fears felt by many planters of the enmity of
their former slaves were exceeded only by the small farmers’ quite general
feeling that the planters would be able to manipulate the votes of their black
subordinates, just as Brooks believed. Thus, while fourteen of the members
who supported Brooks on this roll call had been small or non-slaveholders,
seventeen of those voting to table his resolution had been non-slaveholders
and eighteen more had been small slaveholders.
The same doubts are apparent in the second roll call on Brooks’s proposal,
a motion to reconsider the earlier vote. By this time, late in the legislative
session, the first Military Reconstruction Act was making its way through
Congress. This indication that the federal government might be willing to
protect the independence of the black vote with military power had exactly
the effect one might have predicted. The number of former large slaveholders
who supported Brooks’s position fell from eleven to seven while the number
of former non-slaveholders who voted with him rose from four to ten.
Apparently the growing strength of Radical sentiment in the North had
increased both planters’ alarm at an independent black electorate and at
least some small farmers’ confidence in the prospects for it.
There can be no doubt that the Radicals in Congress had very little real
understanding of the subtleties of social conflict in the former slave South.
A great many of them seem to have been afflicted with a romantic faith
in democracy that led them to believe that black enfranchisement would
solve the region’s problems at a single stroke. Virtually none of them ap-
preciated that the addition of blacks to the electorate would represent, for
a state like Alabama, a significant intrastate sectional shift in legislative and
political influence, from the small-farming to the plantation counties. In-
deed, almost all Radicals thought that planters controlled southern politics
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already, and understood themselves to be attacking, rather than threaten-
ing to strengthen, planter influence. But in the Presidential Reconstruction
legislature’s debates of Nathan Brooks’s various proposals, that was the
all-important consideration at every stage. Far from opposing black enfran-
chisement, the former large slaveholders were enthusiastic about it, so long
as they could be confident that they could control the freedmen’s votes.
Far from opposing black enfranchisement simply on racial grounds, most
white small-farmer representatives were doubtful because they believed—
and the future would confirm their analysis—that neither federal nor state
government would be capable of protecting the freedmen from the planters’
manipulation.
Adam Fairclough argues that black enfranchisement inevitably plunged
the Black Belt into class warfare between the landless black labor force
and the white landowners. But the class conflict that shaped the debate
in Alabama’s Presidential Reconstruction legislature was the one that had
dominated the state throughout the antebellum era, and would dominate it
for the rest of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries—the
one between the Black Belt grandees and the white small farmers in the hill
counties and the wiregrass.
Once the Black Belt planters had succeeded in gaining the control of the
black vote in their counties, which many of them had assumed they would
have at the outset, they proceeded to use it, in effect, to rule the state. It was
the mechanism through which they suppressed the repeated recrudescences
of small-farmer Jacksonianism, first in the form of the Greenbackers and
subsequently as the Populists. And when, following the Populist Revolt with
its demand for “a free ballot and a fair count,” the Black Belters became
convinced that the eventual emergence of an independent black vote was
a risk too great to accept, the black vote was, in the supreme irony of
the experiment in black enfranchisement, the mechanism through which
the Black Belters accomplished its elimination. In the referendum on the
ratification of the disfranchising Constitution of 1901, the fifty-four counties
outside the Black Belt rejected ratification by some 76,000 to 72,000. But
such was the purported enthusiasm of black voters in the Black Belt for
their own disfranchisement that the constitution swept the twelve Black Belt
238
Class ConFLict and Black Enfranchisement in Alabama
counties by some 36,000 to 5,500; the black vote in these twelve counties
thus carried the constitution to victory.
It would appear at first glance, of course, that with this result, the Black
Belt regency had deprived itself of its means of domination. But in fact, at
the constitutional convention of 1901, just as at the convention of 1865,
the critical question was the basis of legislative apportionment. The small-
farming counties pressed for apportionment based on the number of regis-
tered voters—with disfranchisement, effectively a restoration of the white
basis that had been eliminated in the Constitution of 1867. The 1901 con-
vention itself, however, was apportioned on total population and with this
apportionment, after a bitter struggle, the Black Belters were able to secure
the retention of total population for the legislature. The consequence was a
legislature in which a very small electorate in the Black Belt counties sent
large numbers of members—and often the same members—to each house,
session after session. In Nathan Brooks’s Lowndes County, for instance, af-
ter disfranchisement had done its work by 1904, there were 1,142 registered
voters; these 1,142 voters (or the portion of them who paid their poll tax
each January) elected their own state senator and two state representatives,
based on the county’s total population in 1900 of 35,651. Such grossly
disproportionate representation was sufficient to allow Black Belt whites
to defend their interests from virtually all of the white counties’ assaults
throughout the first half of the twentieth century—interests that included
freezing into place the 1901 apportionment, despite vast population changes,
until the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the Alabama reapportionment
case, Reynolds v. Sims, in 1964. In the century-long struggle between the
small-farming and plantation counties, then, the actual effect of the disfran-
chisement of 1901 was to allow the white counties the opportunity to win
elections for statewide offices, while at the same time delivering to the Black
Belt nearly impregnable control of the legislature.
Adam Fairclough, whose fine work has taught us so much about the
civil rights movement, knows as well as anyone the many and complicated
interactions between race and power in the South. Yet his portrait of Re-
construction depicts its conflicts as limited to the freedmen and their former
owners, as if the vast mass of formerly non-slaveholding white small farmers
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who were the bulk of the southern population were mere spectators at the
main event. The truth, of course, is that emancipation and black enfran-
chisement altered the status of every Southerner, of every race and class.
The initial advocates of black enfranchisement were planters who wished
to use the black vote for their own purposes. The Republicans who actu-
ally accomplished the reform sought to use the black vote for very different
purposes. The freedmen tried, in the end unsuccessfully, to exercise their
franchise to defend their own interests. The planters eventually won this
battle. But at every point along the way, the white small farmers understood
that their Jacksonian aspirations were vitally at stake, and their response to
black suffrage is a central and inescapable part of the story.
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